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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) , stating that the Court 
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the 
District Court involving domestic relations cases, including 
but not limited to divorce and property division. Rule 3 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also indicates a 
procedure for taking appeals from judgments and orders of 
trial courts. This brief follows the structural 
requirements outlined in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure. This is an appeal by James Byron 
Medlin, Defendant, from a judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
making the award of alimony that it did. 
•2. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are insufficient to support the award of alimony. 
3. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
making the property division that it did. 
4. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are insufficient with regard to the division of 
property• 
5. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are insufficient to support the Court's award of 
attorney's fees. 
6* Whether the Findings of Fact entered by the 
District Court with regard to valuation of the law practice 
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and marital business against the clear weight of the 
evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellate 
Court must reverse if there is a misapplication or 
misunderstanding of the law, it the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings or conclusions or ir 
there is a serious inequity that must be rectified as set 
forth in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Honorable Leslie M. Lewis of the Third 
District Court on the 15th day of December, 1992. M (r. 
384-396 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
At trial, Plaintiff appeared and was represented by 
Attorney Kathleen McConkie. Defendant, an attorney licensed 
to practice in the State of Utah, represented himself 
through the entire proceedings. The Court took certain 
matters under advisement and entered partial Findings as to 
certain issues and ordered both parties to prepare proposed 
Findings and to submit them to the Court. T* Ruling at p. 
6 c Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "Vee"), submitted 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on or about December 
1, 1992e Re 353 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
Defendant (hereinafter referred to as "James") objected to 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law en 
November 23, 1992, R. 344 (Objections to Plaintiffs 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; and Decree 
of Divorce) . James did not submit proposed Findings of FacTc 
and Conclusions of Law. 
The Trial Court, apparently using Vee's proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, accepted these 
Findings of Fact and made its own changes and corrections to 
certain areas. R. 353-359 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law including Judge's notes). The Court then took its 
corrected Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
entered them on the 15th day of December, 1992. (R. 396 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) . James filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal on the 13rh day of January, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties herein were married June 23, 1954. T. 127. 
During the course of the marriage, James completed a Juris 
Doctorate Degree in 1957. T. 126. Vee completed a Masters 
Degree in Speech Pathology. T. 199. The parties acquired 
and developed a corporation known as Work Making 
Productions. Vee developed the products marketed by Word 
Making Productions, but the business aspect of the 
corporation was handled by James. T. 134-137. During the 
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Course of the marriage, James also worked as an attorney. 
Vee worked off and on during the course of the marriage and 
worked full-time just prior to filing for divorce, at which 
time she was laid off. T. 76. Vee suffered considerable 
health problems during the course of the marriage which 
continued through the time of the trial. R. 386 (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law) . There are no minor 
children. 
Upon trial of the matter, the Court awarded Vee 
permanent alimony which took the form of James1 one-half 
share of the equity in the parties1 home, $2,687.00 per 
quarter as royalty monies paid toward Word Making 
Productions, and $1.00 per year. The Court further ordered 
that Vee could have alimony reviewed on an Order to Show 
Cause calendar. R. 384-396 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) . The Court further specifically found 
that James was "either unable or unwilling to pay monthly 
alimony." R- 387 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
The Court divided the real and personal property of the 
marriage, awarding the home and the assets of the marital 
business to Vee and the law practice to James. The Court 
required Vee to pay the mortgage payment on the parties' 
home but ordered James to pay all other debts and 
obligations of the marriage and of the Word Making 
Production business. James was also ordered to pay 
of Vee's attorney's fees and costs incurred in the action. 
R. 384-396 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). James 
filed a timely appeal from this decision on January 13, 
1992. R. 415 (Notice of Appeal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
James1 Appeal is primarily centered around three (3) 
issues, those being alimony/ division of real and personal 
property and attorney fees. The Court abused its discretion 
in these areas or entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law which were not adequately supported by the evidence 
or which were insufficient altogether. 
With regard to alimony, the Court entered a specific 
finding to Vee's ability to work and as to her expenses but 
did not specifically enter a finding as to James' ability to 
produce income. The Court further found that James was 
either unwilling or unable to pay alimony. Apparently based 
upon that finding, the Court did not set a monthly payment 
of alimony but rather awarded Vee the equity in the parties 
home as alimony and quarterly royalties in excess of 
$2,600.00 from the Word Making Production business as 
alimony. This in spite of the fact that Vee was awarded the 
vast bulk of the assets of the marriage and that James was 
awarded the vast bulk of the debts and obligations of the 
marriage. 
The Court also abused its discretion in terms of its 
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division of the real and personal property. The Court did 
not value the personal property. The Court arbitrarily set 
a value of James1 law practice in spite of testimony and 
evidence that the law practice and the Word Making 
Production business were almost entirely co-mingled/ and 
that neither were actively engaged in business. The Court 
further erred in awarding the Word Making Production to 
James and placing a value on it of $75,000.00 when that 
value has no basis in fact. The net result of the Court's 
property division is that Vee has property with a value of 
approximately $167,000.00 and James has property which, when 
the debt obligations is subtracted from that value, is a net 
value to him of less than $6,000.00. 
The Court further erred in awarding attorney fees, 
presumably on some notion that there was bad faith on the 
part of James in failing to attempt to settle. This 
presumption was not support by the record or by the 
Findings. 
The Court in this case entered findings which 
preponderate against the actual evidence taken at trial and 
which resulted in a serious inequity between the parties. 
As such, the case should be reversed and remanded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF 
ALIMONY. 
The Court should remand this case for further findings 
with regard to alimony on the basis that the Findings and 
Conclusions entered below are not sufficient to support the 
alimony award. In the alternative, the Court should reverse 
and take further evidence with regard to alimony on the 
basis that the evidence at trial preponderates against the 
finding of alimony entered by the Court. 
A. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
inadequate to support the award of alimony. 
The factors that a Court must consider in making an 
award of alimony are well established in recent case law.. 
These factors are 1, the financial conditions and needs of 
the wife; 2, the ability of the wife to produce an income 
for herself; and 3, the ability of the husband to provide 
support. Se^ e Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985) . In viewing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law then, this Court must consider whether the Findings 
address each of those factors. 
The second factor, that being the ability of the wife 
to produce a sufficient income for herself, is clearly 
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addressed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Those findings are as follows £ 
1. The Court finds that the parties are both 61 
years of age and that Plaintiff has a Master Degree in 
Speech Pathology. r. 385 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law). 
2|» The Court finds that Plaintiff has not been 
regularly employed in a full time capacity, out of the 
home, since early in the marriage, and has no license 
here to teach. r. 386 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) 
3e The Court finds that the Plaintiff has used 
her Master Degree in Speech Pathology in her creativity 
and business acumen to create and develope the Word 
Making Production business very early in the marriage, 
i 
and that she has developed a new product for Work 
Making as recently as 1991 while she was at home. r. 
386 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
4|- The Court finds that the Plaintiff is largely 
responsible for the creation and development of Word 
Making Production, in that most of the products that 
comprise that business were strictly her creation, r. 
386 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
5. The Court finds that at present Plaintiff is 
unemployed and is experiencing serious and significant 
health problems most of which will exacerbate over 
time... the Court finds the Plaintiff is severely 
impaired at this point and is unable to work at the 
present time. r. 387 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law) 
6. All royalty monies paid to Word Making 
Productions, Ltd. from the Pro Ed contract (approximately 
$2,687.00 per quarter for an indeterminate time) shall also 
be awarded to Plaintiff as alimony, r. p.390 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
The first factor set forth above is not treated in as 
much detail. With regard to the financial conditions and 
needs of the wife the Court entered the following: 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff's reasonable 
monthly expenses are in excess of $2,160.33 per month 
(that figure does not include food) as set forth in 
Exhibit 50. 
The Court finds the alimony award set forth herein will 
allow Plaintiff to live close to the standard of living 
enjoyed by the Plaintiff during the marriage. r. 388 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
The Court then listed certain findings with regard to 
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the Defendant the most relevant of which is as follows: 
The Court finds that Defendant is either unable or 
unwilling to pay monthly alimony, r. 387 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
It is in this finding or lack of other sufficient 
findings that the Court errs. The Utah Supreme Court has 
clearly held that the trial court must make findings on all 
material issues. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P„2nd 996 (Utah 
1987). These findings should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on which factual issue was 
reachedc Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P*2nd 952, 958 (Utah 1988). 
Quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P*2nd 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
In the case at bar, the Court entered a specific 
finding as to the financial conditions and the needs of the 
spouse seeking alimony and the ability of the spouse seeking 
alimony to produce sufficient income. The Court failed, 
however, to enter adequate findings as to the ability of the 
paying spouse to provide support. All the Court finds in 
this regard is that he is unable or unwilling to pay monthly 
alimony. The questions which James poses is, what does that 
mean? This finding simply concludes that the Defendant is 
unable or unwilling to pay support without saying why. The 
Supreme Court has clearly held that Findings of Fact made by 
the trial court which fail to specifically set forth the 
paying spouses financial condition, income and ability to 
pay are insufficient. Stevens at 958. There is no finding 
with regard to respondents income except that he has 
generated an unknown amount of income from his law practice, 
that he has marketable skills to earn a living and that he 
can use those skills to live a life close to the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage, r. 388 (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law). There is no specific finding as to 
how much James makes on a monthly basis or as to why he is 
unable or unwilling to pay alimony. The Court has reached a 
conclusion not supported by facts. As a result, the Court 
should remand on this issue for further findings. 
B. The Court erred in awarding marital property as 
alimony. 
Rather than have James pay a monthly amount of alimony 
the court awarded the permanent alimony as follows: 
1. Defendant's one-half share in the equity of 
the parties home. 
2. All royalty monies paid to Word Making 
Productions from the Pro-ed contract. 
3. $1.CC a year in permanent alimony, r. 390 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) . 
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These conclusions of law are, presumably, based upon 
the Courtfs previous findings that Defendant was unable or 
unwilling to pay alimony. That finding is simply not 
supported by the evidence and, as a result there is a 
serious inequity that must be rectifiede 
This case has some similarity to the case of Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). In the Bell case, the 
Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with a 
conclusory statement that the husband could "afford nothing" 
for payment of alimony. The Court then set alimony at the 
amount of $250*00 per month for the wife and awarded her 
$6,000.00 in personal property to compensate her for that 
alimony awardo The Court reversed and remanded on issues of 
alimony on the basis of the conclusory and contradictory 
findings. As an example, the Court entered findings as to 
the amount of expenses each party had but no findings as to 
whether they were reasonable, the Court entered a finding 
that the husband could afford nothing in terms of payment of 
alimony but that he made $40,000.00 per year. Finally, the 
Court found that the wife needed "a great deal" of alimony 
but gave her no monetary award. See Bell at 493. 
In the case at bar the Findings and Conclusions are 
likewise conclusory and contradictory. The Court concludes 
that James is either unwilling or unable to pay alimony and 
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yet finds that he has generated a significant but unknown 
amount of income from his law practice. The Court finds 
that the Defendant has the skill to enjoy a life style close 
to the standard enjoyed during the marriage but does not 
make a finding as to what that standard is as there is no 
finding as to James living expenses. The Court finds that 
James is very able bodied and capable of contributing to his 
own support and the support of Plaintiff but then in the 
very next finding notes that he is unable to pay monthly 
alimony. Based on those findings the Court then declines to 
enter a monthly award of alimony and instead gives Vee 
James1 portion of the equity in the home and all the royalty 
interest from the marital business as alimony. r. 384 -
390 {Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
Finally, in the Decree of Divorce the Court awards the 
permanent alimony "to equalize the parties respective 
standard of living". But the Court makes no finding as to 
James' necessary standard of living expenses, or as to how 
his standard of living can be equal to Vee's when she is 
awarded the entire marital home and all income from the 
marital business. r. 404 (Judgment and Decree of Divorce) ... 
As a result of these inequities, the case should be remanded 
for further disposition with regard to alimony. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS PROPERTY DIVISION, 
When a Decree of Divorce is entered, the Court may 
include in it equitable orders "relating to the children, 
propertyf and parties ...." Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(1) 
(1989) . The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that this 
statute confers broad discretion upon trial courts in the 
division of property and to allocate property in the manner 
which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits 
them to pursue separate lives. Walters v» Walters, 812 P.2d 
64, 67 (Utah App. 1991), quoting Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 
133. 134-35 (Utah 1987)o In the instant case, the Court 
abused its discretion by entering a division of property 
which was not equitable under the circumstances. 
a* Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
insufficient to support the division of real and 
personal property* 
With regard to the real property the Court entered the 
following finding: 
The Court finds , based on the testimony of Mr, 
Topham and Mr. Duncan, that the marital home is valued 
at $162,000.00, and Word Making is valued at 
$75,000.00, and the Defendant's law practice is valued 
at $35,000.00. 
The Court then, in its conclusions of law, awards Vee 
half of the equity of the parties home (the other half was 
awarded to her as alimony), all household furnishings in her 
possession and one-half the Golden Eagle contract. James 
was awarded Word Making Productions, his law office 
business, household property, both IRA's, a vested 
retirement plan, a vested Keogh, and one-half of the Golden 
Eagle contract. r. 391 -393 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law)„ 
The Court goes on to make a certain division of 
personal property but does not make a finding as to its 
value, r. 393 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). As 
a result, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
insufficient with regard to the division of personal 
property. 
In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App. 
1988) , the Court remanded the case with regard to the 
property valuation in distribution, on the basis that the 
trial Court did not identify the items of marital property 
and debt, and did not assign values to each item of 
distributed property and debt or a total value to the 
cumulative share awarded to each party. Id at 955. The 
Court concluded that it could not perform its reviewing 
function and determine whether the parties property was 
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equitably distributed without the trial court's detailed 
identification and valuation of the assets and debts awarded 
to each party. They vacated that portion of the judgment 
pertaining to property and debt distribution and remanded 
for adequate factual findings allowing the trial court to 
adjust the property distribution as necessary. Id at 955. 
In the immediate case the Court awarded each party the 
personal property in their possession with certain 
exceptions. The Court did not enter a value as to that 
property. The Court awarded James a 1985 Honda CRX but did 
not enter a value as to that property. The Court did enter 
a value as to the home, Word Making Productions and the law 
office business but did not enter a value as to the amounts 
in the IRA's, vested retirement plan, or vested Keogh. The 
Court did not enter a total value to the cumulative share 
awarded to each party. 
The Court entered a conclusion listing the amount of 
debt owed on the home, for delinquent taxes, furnace repair 
bill, and a personal property appraisal but did not enter 
the amount of debt associated with the James1 law practice, 
Word Making's retirement fund, the Visa obligation as well 
as any debt to Margene Nagasawa, James1 secretary. The 
Court also states that James should be responsible for all 
other marital debts of the parties but does not list an 
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amount. Further, that James would be obligated for all 
debts owed by Word Making Productions or owed to Word Making 
Productions or its retirement fund but does not list those 
amounts. 
It is a well settled rule of law that the trial Court 
must make findings on all material issues, and its failure 
to do so constitutes reversible error "unless the facts in 
the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Carlton 
v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 1988). Quoting Acton v. 
J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). Clearly, the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are not sufficient 
on all material issues. The Court must, therefore, look to 
see whether the facts in the record are clear and 
uncontroverted. James asserts that exactly the opposite is 
true. 
b* The record is not clear, uncontroverted or 
capable of supporting the trial court's findings. 
Of the real property, personal property, business 
interest and debt issues as set forth in the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the only item not disputed at 
trial was the value of the parties home. Even this issue 
had some discussion wherein James attempted to show that the 
lot was sufficiently large enough that another home could be 
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built on it and attempted to show that the home itself could 
not produce rental income based on the zoning laws in that 
area* T. volume 1, p. 15 and volume 2, p. 42, 43. The 
remaining issues and even their values were disputed at 
trial. 
Initially James disputes, and disputed at trial, the 
value placed on the business and upon his law practice. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law place a value of 
$75,000.00 on the business and a value of $35,000.00 on the 
law practice. These values were based upon testimony of 
Dean Duncan, a CPAC These figures were also very much 
disputed by James at trial. See generally, T. volume 1 p. 
97 - 109* 
James attempted to show at trial, that the $75,000.00 
placed as a value on Word Making Productions was a value 
only as a write off to a company that was going to make a 
lot of money and needed a tax write off. T. volume 1 p.98. 
In addition, testimony at trial admitted that the company 
was "dormant". T. volume 1 p.109. 
With regard to the law practice testimony at trial 
indicated that the $35,000*00 figure was arrived at by 
looking at the "ability to produce money, good will, and 
client list". Tc volume 1 p. 108. In addition, certain 
assets were listed as value for the law practice which 
actually belong to Word Making Productions. T. volume 1 p. 
107. James testified at trial and, on direct examination, 
went through his law practice income for each year from 1974 
through 1991. His average income over those years is 
$4,181.45 per year. T. volume 2 p. 73 - 76. James1 income 
was derived primarily through his work at Word Making 
Productions. The assets of the law practice and Word Making 
Productions were very much co-mingled. T. volume 2 p. 73 -
78. 
The Court abused its discretion in entering findings 
placing a value of $75,000.00 on Word Making Productions and 
a value of $35,000.00 on James1 law practice. The 
$75,000.00 figure was a value which, the expert admitted, 
was ei ual to the tax write off benefits that a business 
would have if it were a going concern. The same expert 
admitted that this business was "dormant" and thus not a 
going concern. In addition, testimony at trial revealed, as 
set forth above, that the business had only one asset that 
being the royalty payments all of which go to Vee. The 
$75,000.00 value, therefore, is illusory and based on facts 
which can not and are not present with Word Making 
Productions. 
The law practice, which was valued at $35,000.00, had 
in excess of $27,000.00 of that amount attributed to being a 
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going concern, ability to produce money and "good will". Tc 
volume 2 p* 107/ 108 * James1 testimony at trial indicated 
that he was not certain that he would return to the practice 
of law/ Te volume 2 p* 84/ and that he had less than 10 
active clients/ T. volume 1/ pe139. The idea of placing 
that value based on "good will"/ is improper. There can be 
no good will in a business that is dependent for its 
existence upon the individual who conducts the enterprise 
and would vanish were the individual to die, retire/ or quit 
work. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah 1988) 
Quoting, Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 1966). The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law show that James' 
sole source of income at this point is Social Security 
benefits in the amount of $719.00 per montho (r. p.389 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
The Court has, therefore, entered a finding of fact and 
conclusion of law that goes against the great weight of the 
evidence which shows that over the past 17 years the law 
practice has actually generated very little income, has few 
assets in as much as the assets are co-mingled with Word 
Making Productions/ currently has fewer than 10 clients and 
is not even operating. 
The evidence at trial further clearly preponderates 
against any finding that there has been an equitable 
division of real and personal property. There has been such 
serious inequity in the Court's finding that this Court 
should find a clear abuse of discretion has resulted. As 
set forth by James in his objection to Plaintiff's proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce, the proposed division of property would result in 
the following: 
Net assets awarded to the Plaintiff: 
Asset Value 
Equity in home (one-half as 
equity, one-half as alimony) $156,000.00 
Household goods 10,830.00 
Total assets Plaintiff would have $166,830.00. 
Net assets awarded to the Defendant: 
Asset Value 
Household goods ? 8,419.00 
Automobile 2,500.00 
Retirement benefits 36,154.00 
Total assets Defendant would have $47,073.00 
Not only is the inequity in the division of assets 
manifest by this list, but the Court must take into 
consideration the debt that James is also ordered to pay and 
credit those against the assets he received as follows: 
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Debt Amount 
Attorney fees $13,000.00 
Temporary alimony 15,000*00 
Taxes on marital home 4,500.00 
Debts on law practice 7,000.00 
Visa 1,900.00 
Bill for furnace 700.00 
Total $42,100.00 
The result is that James ends up with net assets of 
$4,973c00 and Vee ends up with net assets of $168,830.00. 
It is true that James also ends up with the Word Making 
productions business and his law practice. However, there 
is no value, in reality, that can be placed upon these 
businesses. As indicated above the findings placing a value 
of $75,000.00 on the business and $35,000,00 on the law 
practice are not supported by evidence at trial. 
The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable 
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property 
interests. The party appealing from that property interest 
has the burden to prove that there is a misapplication or 
misunderstanding of the law or that the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings; or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 
1977) . As indicated above, the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings entered with regard to 
the property division. No values are entered on certain 
items of property. The values entered as to the business 
and the law practice where shown at trial to be illusory and 
yet they were still entered as findings. As a result, a 
serious inequity has occurred leaving James at no where near 
the standard of living to be enjoyed by Vee. The trial 
court has abused its discretion in the property division to 
such an extent that the issue should be reversed and 
remanded. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING JAMES TO PAY 
VEE'S ATTORNEY FEES. 
Under Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1989) a court may 
award attorney fees in a divorce proceeding. "In order to 
award attorney fees, the trial court must find the 
requesting party is in need of financial assistance and that 
the fees requested are reasonable." Walters v. Waltersr 812 
P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1991) . 
The Court, in its ruling with regard to attorney fees 
indicated as follows: 
Additionally, I am going to find that Ms. McConkie 
is entitled to attorney fees. I will find that 
her testimony supports her hourly rate. I will 
find that that is reasonable in the community, and 
that the attorney fees were reasonably incurred. 
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In connection with that, I will specifically find 
that this case has been set for pre-trial three 
times by my count, once with Judge Stirba,, who 
indicated to the court that there was absolutely 
no effort on Defendant's part to settle this case. 
I will indicate that consequently, I believe all 
of the fees for representation have been 
necessarily incurred- And I will award fees in 
the amount supported by the exhibits and by the 
testimony of counseL I will also award judgment 
to the Plaintiff from the Defendant in the amount 
of the costs set forth on the exhibit submitted to 
the Court. T. ruling, p*4 
Initially, James points out that the Court is incorrect 
that the case had been set for pre-trial three times. The 
record indicates there were actually only two hearings which 
would be considered pre-trials, that being a hearing in 
front of Commissioner Sandra Peuler on June 24, 1992, which 
is actually entitled a "Motion hearing" but in which the 
matter is certified for trial. r. p.164 (Minute Entry). 
The second pre-trial is before Judge Lewis on September 25, 
1992 which is a standard pre-trial in anticipation of the 
trial to be held in October, r. p.269 (Minute Entry) The 
matter to which Judge Lewis refers to as being set in front 
of Judge Stirba was actually a scheduling conference set on 
May 29, 1992 and not a pre-trial. There is no record as to 
what went on in that settlement conference with Judge Stirba 
and therefore, it is uncertain how Judge Lewis arrived at 
the conclusion that there was no effort on the-part of James 
to settle the matter. 
Second, the Court found the fees to be necessary as a 
consequence of Defendant's purported failure to try and 
settle the case; a conclusion which is based on facts not in 
evidence nor appearing in the record. 
In addition, there was no presentation of facts 
establishing Vee' s financial need accompanying the request 
for attorney's fees. Therefore, the award of attorney fees 
is inadequately supported. See Anderson v. Anderson, 368 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1962) In addition, no finding was entered 
with regard to the ability of James to pay attorney fees as 
is also required by §30-3-3 of the Utah Code and under case 
law. See Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). In the case of Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) , the Utah Court of Appeals discussed 
an award of attorney fees. "The Court made no findings en 
wife's need for the payment of her fees, husband's ability 
to pay the fees, or the reasonableness of the attorney 
fees." Bell at p.494. 
In the immediate case, the only finding entered by the 
Court is that "Plaintiff needs assistance from the Defendant 
in paying her attorney fees." This is a finding set forth 
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. r. p. 388 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) Attorney fees 
were based on the testimony of Kathleen McConkie, attorney 
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for Vee but no facts were set forth specifically with regard 
to Vee's need for payment of her fees. In addition, no 
facts were specifically set forth regarding James1 ability 
to pay feeSc The fees in this case for Kathleen McConkie 
totaled in excess of $13,000*00. r. p.398 (Supplemental 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees). As set forth in argument 
above, James has no means of paying these fees. He has no 
income from Word Making Productions with which to pay fees. 
The income from his law practice is extremely limited and 
has been for more than a decade. He testified that he may 
not be going back into the regular practice of law. James1 
income, then, is limited to Social Security Benefits which 
are insufficient to pay the exorbitant amount of fees in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court has abused its discretion and, as a 
result, a serious inequity has occurred in this case. The 
initial order which proved to be inequitable was that of 
alimony. The Court awarded Vee alimony by awarding her 
James1 interest in the parties home and all of the royalty 
income from the parties business. In addition, the Court 
awarded Vee $1.00 per year. No order was entered with 
regard to James1 ability to pay except that he was "unable 
or unwilling to pay alimony". If James is unable to pay 
alimony then one of the three factors considered in making 
an alimony award is not present and alimony should thus not 
be ordered. If James is unwilling to pay alimony then the 
Court's remedy is to order alimony and have him held in 
contempt if he does not pay. 
The second inequity from the Court's ruling is with 
regard to the property division. James has shown that he 
is, effectively awarded less than $6,000.00 in actual value 
when the debt is considered. Vee, on the other hand is 
awarded in excess of $166,000.00 in assets. The Court also 
failed to enter a finding as to the value of certain items 
of personal property, and the Court's finding with regard to 
a valuation of the marital business and James1 law practice 
is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Finally, the Court erred in awarding Vee her attorney 
fees. No facts were entered with regard to Vee's need, and 
certainly James has no ability to pay. As a result, the 
case should be reversed and remanded on each of these 
issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Hjlk day of April, 1993. 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY 
PETSTN. VLAHO^, 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jgtftf^ W. BRA; 
Attorney for7App 
BSJEY? V 
7 ellant 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. All references are to the pages of the original 
record as paginated by the Clerk of the District Court, 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Appelate Procedure, Rule 25(e). 
All documents in the record referred to will be found in the 
Appendix in the order referred to in the Brief. For purpose 
of clarity, the following abbreviations shall be aopted by 
Appellant i 
"R." refers to the record with its page number and 
title of the document in parenthesis. 
"T." refers to the transcript. 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADA VEE MEDLIN, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : CIVIL NO. 924900335 
JAMES BYRON MEDLIN, 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 14th day of 
October, 1992, at the hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis. Plaintiff was present in court and was 
represented by counsel, Kathleen McConkie. Defendant was 
present in court and represented himself, pro se. The Court 
heard testimony as to jurisdiction and grounds, and as to 
property allocation and alimony. The Court, having heard the 
testimony of the parties and other witnesses and argument of 
counsel for both parties, and having considered all of the 
evidence received at trial, and having considered plaintiff's 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
defendant's Objections, the Court now makes and enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that both parties are residents of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for more than 
three months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
2. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction in this 
matter and that the waiting period has passed. 
3. The Court finds that the parties have been married 
since the 23rd day of June, 1954. 
4. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
arisen in the marriage between the parties, making continuation 
of the marriage impossible, and that the plaintiff is entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce from the defendant on that basis. 
5. The Court finds that this is a long-term marriage (38 
years) and that the parties have no minor children; and that 
during the marriage plaintiff has raised the parties' children, 
and run the parties' home. 
6. The Court finds that the parties are both 61 years of 
age and that the plaintiff has a master's degree in speech 
pathology, and the defendant has a juris doctorate. 
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7. The Court finds that the plaintiff has not been 
regularly employed in a full-time capacity, out of the home, 
since early in the marriage, and has no licensure to teach, 
and that the defendant is a licensed lawyer, who has practiced 
law since 1957. 
8. The Court finds that the plaintiff worked full-time to 
put defendant through law school and that plaintiff has always 
been the primary caretaker of the parties7 children. 
9. The Court finds that the plaintiff used her master's 
degree in speech pathology and her creativity and business 
acumen to create and develop the Word Making Production 
business very early in the marriage, and that she has developed 
a new product for Word Making, as recently as 1991, while she 
was at home. 
10. The Court finds that plaintiff is largely responsible 
for the creation and development of Word Making Production, and 
that most of the products that comprise that business were 
strictly her creation. 
11. The Court finds that at present plaintiff is 
unemployed and is experiencing serious and significant health 
problems, most of which will exacerbate over time, these 
include but are not limited to, a severe hearing loss, a 
shorter right leg, right hip and ankle problems, a "crippled 
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foot", chronic sinus problems, cancer (double mastectomy), 
severe rheumatoid arthritis (affecting the feet, spine, neck, 
elbows and hands), some vision problems, memory loss, severe 
dental problems, respiratory problems, and ongoing problems 
with fatigue, severe pain and difficulty with sleeping. 
The Court bases this finding on the plaintiff's testimony, 
and the defendant's testimony that plaintiff has had "poor 
health from the beginning of the marriage", and on the Court's 
own observations concerning the plaintiff's appearance, 
demeanor, walk, and speech. The Court finds that plaintiff is 
severely impaired at this point and is unable to work at the 
present time. The Court further finds that these medical 
problems necessitate ongoing medical treatment, expenses and 
the taking of prescribed medication. 
12.- The Court finds that defendant has testified to, and 
appears to be in, good health, with the exception of a minor 
hearing problem, and appears very able-bodied and capable of 
contributing to his own support and the support of plaintiff. 
13. The Court finds that defendant is either unable or 
unwilling to pay monthly alimony. 
14. The Court finds that plaintiff's reasonable monthly 
expenses are in excess of $2,160.33 per month (that figure does 
not include food), as set forth in Exhibit 50. 
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15. The Court finds the alimony award set forth herein 
will allow plaintiff to live close to the standard of living 
enjoyed by the plaintiff during the marriage. 
16. The Court finds the defendant has worked throughout 
the marriage, practicing law and has generated a significant 
but unknown amount of income from the practice. That, based 
upon the testimony, it is clear defendant has under-valued and 
misrepresented his law practice income. Defendant has 
marketable skills to earn a living and can use these to live a 
life close to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. 
17. The Court finds that plaintiff needs assistance from 
the defendant in paying her attorney's fees; and that 
plaintiff's counsel, Ms. McConkie's, testimony supports the 
fees and costs as reasonable and necessary. The Court finds 
that at least 3 6 hours of counsel's time, at the rate of 
$115.00 an hour, was expended (through 8/31/92), and $40.00 an 
hour was billed for her paralegal, for a total of $9,112.79 in 
costs and fees and that Ms. McConkie's testimony as to her 
hourly rate and the reasonableness of the fees and their 
necessity was credible. The fees and costs as set forth in 
detail on Exhibit 51 are found to have been necessary. 
Additionally, the Court finds more time has been expended since 
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8/31/92 in hearings, trial preparation and trial, and Ms. 
McConkie is entitled to a reasonable fee for that as well. 
18. The Court finds, based upon the testimony of Mr. 
Topham and Mr. Duncan, that the marital home is valued at 
$162,000, and Word Making is valued at $75,000, and the 
defendant's law practice is valued at $35,000. 
19. The Court finds the defendant is not credible on 
valuing any of the above assets or as to his own income from 
the practice of law. 
20. The Court finds from all of the testimony, including 
defendant's, that the defendant has made significant income 
from the practice of law and has "commingled" these finds with 
Word Making income and has consistently failed to fully reflect 
this income on tax returns and it cannot now be fully and 
accurately determined. 
21. The Court finds defendant will soon be eligible to 
earn social security benefits of $719.00 a month and has 
testified he may or may not retire. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ALIMONY: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to permanent alimony based upon 
the length of the marriage, her health and inability to 
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generate income and the parties' standard of living during the 
marriage and the plaintiff's needs, and defendant's capacity to 
generate income. A permanent alimony award is needed to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
Therefore: 
A. Defendant's one-half share of the equity in the 
parties' home on Ksel Drive shall be awarded to plaintiff 
as permanent alimony. 
B. All royalty monies paid to Word Making 
Productions, Ltd. from the Pro Ed contract approximately 
($2,687.00 per quarter for an indeterminate time) shall 
also be awarded to plaintiff as alimony. 
C. Additionally, one dollar ($1.00) a year in 
permanent alimony is to be paid by defendant to plaintiff. 
D. Defendant is to provide documentation (tax 
returns and pay stubs) of his income on a yearly basis to 
plaintiff, due on or before May of each year. The 
plaintiff has the right to have alimony reviewed by the 
Court on an Order to Show Cause calendar if defendant's 
income increases substantially, such that alimony should be 
increased. 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL INSURANCE 
2. Defendant is to obtain and maintain health, accident, 
and dental insurance for the plaintiff for a period of three 
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years. In the event that insurance coverage should not be 
sufficient to pay all expenses, plaintiff is responsible for 
all uncovered actual expenses and deductible expenses not 
covered by the insurance (including routine office visits). 
PROPERTY 
3. During the course of this marriage, the parties have 
acquired real property and an eighty percent (80%) interest in 
a business, Word Making Productions, as well as other 
personalty and realty. The Court finds that an equitable 
distribution of such assets should be as follows: 
A. The plaintiff should be awarded the following: 
(1) Half of the equity ($156,000) in the Sandy home 
on Ksel Drive (valued at $162,000) as part of her 
property distribution. 
(2) Household furnishings; in her possession with the 
exceptions set forth herein. 
(3) One-half Golden Eagle contract. 
B. The defendant is awarded: 
(1) Word Making Productions, Ltd. 
(2) Law office business 
(3) Household property 
(4) Car 
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(5) Both IRA's 
IRA of Vee Medlin 
IRA of James Medlin 
(6) Vested Retirement Plan 
(7) Vested Keogh 
(8) One-half Golden Eagle Contract 
4. Defendant shall be awarded Word Making Productions, 
Ltd. along with the obligations associated therewith. The 
defendant agrees to hold plaintiff harmless from any and all 
liabilities associated with Word Making Productions, Ltd. and 
indemnify her thereto. 
5. The fair market value of the parties' marital home, 
located at 2775 Ksel Drive, Sandy, Utah, was determined to be 
$162,000 with an approximate balance of $6,400 on the first 
mortgage. This home is awarded to the plaintiff as her sole 
and separate property, subject to her assuming the obligations 
for the first mortgage and holding the defendant harmless 
therefrom. Defendant shall quit-claim his interest in the 
marital residence on or before the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. The plaintiff is awarded a one-half interest in the 
home as part of her share of marital property and she is 
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awarded defendant's one-half interest in the equity in the 
home, as part of the alimony award in this case. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
6. During the course of this marriage, the parties have 
acquired items of personal property. The parties have 
heretofore effected a fair and equitable division of these 
items between them. Each of the parties should be awarded the 
household furniture and personal property now in their 
possession, except that the Court finds the defendant is 
entitled to the Italian Revival dining table and chairs, the 
grandfather clock, and walnut Chippendale secretary which were 
inherited from his mother. 
Defendant is to make arrangements to pick up the items of 
personal property in the possession of plaintiff on or before 
December 30, 1992, on a date certain, convenient and agreeable 
to both parties. If defendant does not pick up said property 
on that specified date, the plaintiff should have the right to 
dispose of that property as she sees fit. 
7. The defendant should be awarded the 1985 Honda CRX 
automobile and should assume the obligations associated 
therewith. 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
8. During the course of this marriage, the parties have 
incurred debts and obligations, both jointly and in their 
0393 
MEDLIN V. MEDLIN PAGE ELEVEN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
separate names• The plaintiff should assume the first mortgage 
on the home located at 2775 E. Ksel Drive, Sandy, Utah, and 
hold the defendant harmless therefrom, in the approximate 
amount of $6,400 with a monthly payment of $416.66. The 
defendant should assume the payment of all back taxes on that 
said property, including but not limited to the taxes due for 
1992. The current tax in the amount of $2,209.16 is due and 
owing on or before November 30, 1992. Defendant should pay 
those taxes on or before that date. The delinquent taxes on 
the marital property are $2,252.77. Defendant should assume 
and pay said tax debt, as quickly as can be arranged and hold 
plaintiff harmless therefrom and indemnify her thereto. 
Specifically, the defendant should pay any and all debts or 
amounts due, associated with defendant's law practice, Word 
Making's retirement fund, the Visa obligation, as well as the 
debt, if any, to Ms. Nagasawa. The defendant should be 
responsible for all other marital debts of the parties. In 
addition, the defendant should specifically pay the $704.00 due 
and owing on the furnace repair, $350 for half of the furniture 
and personal property appraisal, and $450 which is the amount 
due on the appraisal on the marital home. 
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The defendant is responsible for any debts owed by Word 
Making Productions or obligations owed to Word Making 
Productions and/or to its retirement fund. 
9. Plaintiff has a right to and a Judgment should enter 
for all past due temporary alimony awarded in the amount of 
$15,000. Defendant should pay plaintiff the past due amount 
from the IRA accounts and/or the vested Keogh account. That 
amount should be paid on or before November 20, 1992. 
RETIREMENT INTERESTS 
10. The defendant is awarded all retirement funds accrued 
during the course of the parties' marriage, including vested 
Keogh plans, IRA's and vested retirement in Word Making 
Productions, Ltd. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
11. The defendant is ordered to pay all of plaintiff's 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action, which amount 
is due within ninety (90) days, but may be paid on a reasonable 
schedule, from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
and a Judgment for the costs already incurred, set forth on the 
exhibit submitted to Court is entered. Defendant should pay 
fees and costs directly to plaintiff's counsel, Kathleen 
McConkie, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 3 6 S. State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. Defendant is to make payment 
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arrangements with plaintiff's counsel within fourteen (14) days 
of this Decree. Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. McConkie, is to file 
a supplemental affidavit on fees within five (5) days of this 
Ruling. 
INJUNCTION 
12. The Court enjoins the defendant from contacting, 
attempting to visit or to harass the plaintiff in any fashion, 
or going on or near plaintiff's property without plaintiff's 
permission. Further, the Court enjoins both parties from 
making threats against the other or to counsel. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION 
13. Each of the parties should execute such deeds, 
contracts, agreements, or other conveyances as may be necessary 
to transfer the property awarded to the parties. AlS * f\^-\Jn\J^^ 
U/^ ^ (Pateflvthis //day of December, 1992^™**L /; 0 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
to the following, this / day of December, 1992: 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 6 S. State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James Byron Medlin 
Pro se 
2875 S. Main Street, Suite 201A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3500 
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JAMES B. MEDLIN # 2230 
Attorney for Defendant(s) 
2875 South Main Street, Suite 201A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3500 
Tels (801) 484-3951 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADA VEE MEDLIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES BYRON MEDLIN, 
Defendant, 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTD7FS 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW A N D D E C R E E OF 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924900335 DA 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
Comes now the defendant and, pursuant to instructions from the above-entitled 
Court, and objects to the Plaintiffs proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce, in their entirety and more specifically as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Defendant objects to the Findings of Fact as follows: 
1. The defendant objects to a finding that the plaintiff is unable to work. 
2. The defendant objects to the finding that the plaintiff is entitled to her attorney's 
fees because the Court found that Judge Stirba reported to the Court that the defendant 
made absolutely no effort to settle the case at the Settlement Conference. Defendant denies 
that Judge Stirba made such a report, and the file shows no such report having been made 
concerning the defendant. 
f • O f '. 
Defendant objects on the further ground that the Court stated, in this regard, that 
there had been three pre-trials. Defendant points out that there have been two Pre-trials, 
and one Settlement Conference. The Settlement Conference was ordered by the Court, on 
its own motion, the first Pre-Trial is automatically set by the Court, and the second Pre-
Trial was ordered by the Court. The Defendant had not control over nor did he request any 
of the above hearings, and, at each one, tried sincerely, to settle the case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3» Defendant objects to paragraph 10 as follows: 
a. Defendant objects to awarding the home to the plaintiff as stated in the 
plaintiffs proposed paragraph. 
b. The Defendant objects to any award of royalty payments from Word Making 
Productions as part of any alimony award to the plaintiff. 
c. Defendant objects to any award for alimony, whether in the sum of $1.00 per 
year or any other amount. 
d. Defendant objects to any duty to furnish the plaintiff with tax returns in the 
future and further objects to any conclusion that the plaintiff should be able to ask for an 
increase in alimony by way of an Order To Show Cause. 
4. Defendant objects to any order for the defendant to provide health and accident 
coverage or pay the plaintiffs expenses therewith. 
5. Defendant objects to the suggested division of property as suggested in paragraph 
12 of the Conclusions of Law as follows: 
a. 
(1) Defendant objects to the award of the entire equity in the home to the 
plaintiff. 
(2) The Household furnishings have not been divided and specified. The 
plaintiff consistently refused the offer of the defendant, the defendant never agreed 
to the suggested division of the plaintiff except as with some exceptions, none of 
which have been clearly specified between the parties, including the plaintiffs oral 
2 
agreement that the defendant could have six of the twelve place settings of the 
sterling silver. 
(3) The defendant objects to the Court placing any value on the Golden 
Eagle contract on the grounds and for the reason that the appraiser admitted that 
when it was in default, it might have no value whatsoever, and placing a value on 
it makes the division of property distorted. 
(4) The suggested division by the plaintiff gives the plaintiff almost any 
asset which belongs to Word Making Productions, Ltd, and gives the defendant 
what is left, which consists of nothing other than a few pieces of personal 
equipment and furnishings and a large number of debts, yet places a value on it of 
$75,000.00, which the appraiser testified would be of value only if the person 
owning Word Making Productions was in a position to utilize a tax write-off, which 
the defendant is not in a position to utilize. The estimated value of $75,000.00 is a 
figment of the appraiser's imagination and of no value to the defendant who does 
not want it awarded to him with a value of $75,000.00. 
b. 
(1) See objection in (a)(4) hereinabove. This asset has no value to be 
awarded to the defendant, particularly when the plaintiff asks that the defendant 
assume the liabilities of Word Making Productions, Ltd, and hold the plaintiff 
harmless therefrom, which would include any liability for taxes. 
(2) The testimony clearly showed that included in the law office appraisal 
was furniture and fixture which did not belong to the defendant personally as part 
of his law practice, but was part of the equipment and furnishings belonging to 
Word Making Productions, Ltd, thus making an award to the defendant for the 
same items twice. 
(3) See objection to (a)(2) hereinabove. 
(4) No objection. 
(5) No objection. 
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(6) This has no value. The appraiser admitted that in assigning a value 
of $25,000.00, he did not take into consideration that there was a liability against it 
of almost $10,000c00. In addition, the testimony indicated that it was a value on a 
uniform real estate contract, many months in arrears, and that Word Making 
Productions had no monies with which to make any payments to protect any 
interest and that the sellers were going to take foreclosure action. No value should 
be placed on this asset. 
(7) No objection. 
(8) See objection stated in (a)(3) hereinabove. 
6. Defendant objects to paragraph 13 in its entirety. 
7. Defendant objects to paragraph 14 in its entirety, on the grounds and for the reason 
that the equity in the marital home in the sum of $156,000.00, is the only substantial 
assets which the parties have other than some retirement benefits referred to in paragraph 
13(B)(5) and (7) amounting to about $36,000.00. 
8. Defendant objects to paragraph 15 in that it states that the parties have heretofore 
effected a fair and equitable division of those items between them. Such a division has 
never been actually agreed upon between the parties, either prior to or during the course of 
the trial. Until the defendant knows just what items of personal property the parties have 
agreed shall be turned over to the defendant, he cannot make any arrangements to pick 
them up on a day certain prior to December 1, 1992, or at any other time. 
9. Defendant has no objections to paragraph 16. 
10. Defendant objects to paragraph 17 in its entirety. In particular, the defendant 
objects to the Court ordering the defendant to personally assume any obligation to Mrs. 
Nagasawa, which debt arose out of her employment with Word Making Productions Ltd. 
and not from any personal contract with the defendant. Defendant further objects to being 
ordered to assume any obligation for the furnace when the plaintiff admitted in her 
testimony that the defendant specifically objected to the parties incurring any obligation for 
that item, and that the son-in-law used the plaintiffs credit card, without her knowledge 
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and authorization, to incur such expense. 
11. Defendant objects to paragraph 18 in its entirety. 
12. Defendant has no objection to paragraph 19. 
13. Defendant objects to paragraph 20 in its entirety. 
14. Defendant has no objection to paragraph 21 except that any injunction should be 
imposed on both parties equally. 
15. Defendant has no objection to paragraph 22 except as otherwise provided herein, 
and requests that the plaintiff be ordered to sign any Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
necessary to effect transfer of any retirement funds now in her name, or partially in her 
name, to the defendant. 
16. Defendant adopts his objection contained hereinabove, as pertaining to the proposed 
Decree of Divorce. 
17. As a general objection, the defendant states that the proposed division of property 
would result in the following: 
Net assets awarded to the plaintiff: 
Equity in home $156,000.00 
Household Goods $10.830.00 
Total assets the plaintiff will have $166,830.00 
Net assets awarded to the defendant: 
Household Goods $8,419.00 
Automobile $2,500.00 
Retirement benefits $36,154.00 
Total cash value assets $47,073.,00 
Debts to be credited against said assets: 
Attorney's fees $12,000.00 
Temporary alimony $15,000.00 
Taxes on marital home $4,500.00 
Debts on law practice $7,000.00 
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VISA account $1,900.00 
Bill for furnace $700.00 $41.100.00 
The result would be that the defendant would end up with net assets of $5,973.00, 
but would have to sell his car and part of his household furnishings to pay all of the debts 
assigned to him by the proposed Conclusions of Law. 
It is patently unfair to give the plaintiff net assets of $166,830.00 and leave the 
defendant with net assets of less than $6,000.00. 
18. The only reason for the Court giving the defendant any of the assets, 
including any retirement benefits, was with the clear understanding that the Court would 
assign sufficient debts to the defendant to offset nearly all of such assets, to effect the result 
hereinabove. 
19. This is supposed to be a no fault state, but the Court clearly is punishing the 
defendant for marital misconduct by stripping him of almost every asset which he helped 
accumulate during the entire 38 year marriage. This has been apparent to the defendant 
by the Court's continuing bias from the very beginning of this case. 
20. The defendant is filing the objection merely because the Court ordered him to 
do so, and not because he believes the Court will give any serious consideration to any of 
his objections. 
21. The parties would have saved a lot of time, effort and attorney's fees if the 
Court had stated at the very beginning that its intention was to give the plaintiff exactly 
what she asked for which is exactly what the Court intends to do now. The filing of these 
objections is an exercise in futility on the part of the defendant. 
22. When the Court, on two separate occasions, assured the defendant that it 
would read his letters, submitted as exhibits, prior to making a ruling, the defendant knew 
the Court had no such intention, and the Court did not read any of the letters before 
making the essential rulings in this matter. 
23. The defendant filed his affidavit of prejudice in the beginning because he 
knew he would not receive fair treatment, and he has never received fair treatment from 
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the Court and does not expect it and fully anticipates that the Court will adopt the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the plaintiff with no changes. 
Submitted herewith, 
JAMESB. MEDLIN, Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid, on 
November 18,1992, to; 
Kesler & Rust 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorneys at Law 
2000 Beneficial Tower Building 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES B. MEDLIN 
0350 
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Kathleen McConkie (3978) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 537-1508 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADAVEEMEDLIN, ] 
Plaintiff ] 
v. ; 
JAMES BYRON MEDLIN, ] 
Defendant ] 
) JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
} DIVORCE 
»<Sn^i2Jb3 
> \ ^ - - ^ = V ° ^ ^ ' A O a u . 
> CIVIL NO. 924900335 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 14th day of October, 1992, at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. Plaintiff was present in court 
and was represented by counsel, Kathleen McConkie. Defendant was present in court 
and represented himself, pro se. The Court heard testimony as to jurisdiction and 
grounds, and as to property allocation and alimony. The court, having heard the 
testimony of the parties and other witnesses and argument of counsel for both parties, and 
having considered all of the evidence received at trial, and having considered plaintiffs 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and defendant's Objections, the 
Court having made and entered its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
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being fully advised in the premises and in accordance with the facts found and 
Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between 
plaintiff and defendant be, and they are dissolved and the parties restored to unmarried 
status. This Decree of Divorce becoming absolute and final upon entry. 
ALIMONY 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to permanent alimony based upon the length of the 
marriage, her health and inability to generate income and the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage and the plaintiffs standard of living during the marriage and the 
plaintiffs needs, and defendant's capacity to generate income. A permanent alimony 
award is ordered to equalize the parties' respective standards of living. Therefore: 
A. Defendant's one-half share of the equity in the parties' home on Ksel 
Drive is awarded to plaintiff as permanent alimony. 
B. All royalty monies paid to Word Making Production, Ltd. from the Pro 
Ed contract (approximately $2,687.00 per quarter for an indeterminate 
time) is awarded to plaintiff as alimony. 
C. Additionally, one dollar ($1.00) a year in permanent alimony is to be 
paid by defendant to plaintiff. 
D. Defendant is to provide documentation (tax returns and pay stubs) of 
his income on a yearly basis to plaintiff, due on or before May of each 
year. The plaintiff has the right to have alimony reviewed by the Court on 
an Order to Show Cause calendar if defendant's income increases 
substantially, such that alimony should be increased. 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL INSURANCE 
3. Defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain health, accident, and dental 
insurance for the plaintiff for a period of three years. In the event that insurance coverage 
should not be sufficient to pay all expenses, plaintiff is ordered to be responsible for all 
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uncovered actual expenses and deductible expenses not covered by the insurance 
(including routine office visits). 
PROPERTY 
4. During the course of this marriage, the parties have acquired real property 
and an eighty percent (80%) interest in a business, Word Making Productions, as well as 
other personality and realty. The Court orders that an equitable distribution of such assets 
should be as follows: 
A. The plaintiff is awarded the following: 
(1) Half of the equity ($156,000) in the Sandy home on Ksel Drive 
(valued at $162,000) as part of her property distribution. 
(2) Household furnishings; in her possession with the exceptions set 
forth herein. 
(3) One-half Golden Eagle contract. 
B. The defendant is awarded: 
(1) Word Making Productions, Ltd. 
(2) Law office business 
(3) Household property 
(4) Car 
(5) Both IRA's 
IRAofVeeMedlin 
IRA of James Medlin 
(6) Vested Retirement Plan 
(7) Vested Keogh 
(8) One-half Golden Eagle Contract 
5. Defendant is awarded Word Making Productions, Ltd. along with the 
obligations associated therewith. The defendant is ordered to hold plaintiff harmless 
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from any and all liabilities associated with Word Making Productions, Ltd. and 
indemnify her thereto. 
6. The fair market value of the parties' marital home, located at 2775 East 
Ksel Drive, Sandy, Utah, was determined to be $162,000 with an approximate balance of 
$6,400 on the first mortgage. This home is awarded to the plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property, subject to her assuming the obligations for the first mortgage and 
holding the defendant harmless therefrom. Defendant is ordered to quit-claim his interest 
in the marital residence on or before the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The plaintiff is 
awarded a one-half interest in the home as part of her share of marital property and she is 
awarded defendant's one-half interest in the equity in the home, as part of the alimony 
award in this case. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
7. During the course of this marriage, the parties have acquired items of 
personal property. The parties have heretofore effected a fair and equitable division of 
these items between them. Each of the parties is awarded the household furniture and 
personal property now in their possession, except that the Court finds the defendant is 
awarded the Italian Revival dining table and chairs, the grandfather clock, and walnut 
Chippendale secretary which were inherited from his mother. 
Defendant is ordered to make arrangements to pick up the items of personal 
property in the possession of plaintiff on or before December 30, 1992, on a date certain, 
convenient and agreeable to both parties. If defendant does not pick up said property on 
that specified date, the plaintiff has the right to dispose of that property as she sees fit. 
8- The defendant is awarded the 1985 Honda CRX automobile and will 
assume the obligations associated therewith. 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
9. During the course of this marriage, the parties have incurred debts and 
obligations, both jointly and in their separate names. The plaintiff will assume the first 
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mortgage on the home located at 2775 East Ksel Drive, Sandy, Utah, and hold the 
defendant harmless therefrom, in the approximate amount of $6,400 with a monthly 
payment of $416.66. The defendant will assume the payment of all back taxes on that 
said property, including but not limited to the taxes due for 1992. The current tax in the 
amount of $2,209.16 is due and owing on or before November 30, 1992. Defendant is 
ordered to pay those taxes on or before that date. The delinquent taxes on the marital 
property are $2,252.77. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay said tax debt, as quickly 
as can be arranged and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom and indemnify her thereto. 
Specifically, the defendant is ordered to pay any and all debts or amounts due, associated 
with defendant's law practice, Word Making's retirement fund, the Visa obligation, as 
well as the debt, if any, to Ms. Nagasawa. The defendant is ordered to be responsible for 
all other marital debts of the parties. In addition, the defendant is ordered to specifically 
pay the $704.00 due and owing on the furnace repair, $350 for half of the furniture and 
personal property appraisal, and $450 which is the amount due on the appraisal on the 
marital home. The defendant is responsible for any debts owed by Word Making 
Productions or obligations owed to Word Making Productions and/or to its retirement 
fund 
10. Plaintiff has a right to and a Judgment should enter for all past due 
temporary alimony awarded in the amount of $15,000. Defendant should pay plaintiff 
the past due amount from the IRA accounts and/or the vested Keogh account. That 
amount should be paid on or before November 20,1992. 
RETIREMENT INTERESTS 
11. The defendant is awarded all retirement funds accrued during the course of 
the parties, marriage, including vested Keogh plans, IRA's and vested retirement in Word 
Making Productions, Ltd. 
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ATTORNEY FEES 
12. The defendant is ordered to pay all of plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in this action, which amount is due within ninety (90) days, but may be paid on a 
reasonable schedule from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and a judgment 
for the costs already incurred, set forth on the exhibit submitted to Court is entered. 
Defendant should pay fees and costs directly to plaintiffs counsel, Kathleen McConkie, 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Defendant is to make payment arrangements with plaintiffs counsel within fourteen (14) 
days of this decree. Plaintiffs counsel, Ms. McConkie, is to file a supplemental affidavit 
on fees within five (5) days of this Ruling. 
INJUNCTION 
13. The Court enjoins the defendant from contacting, attempting to visit or 
harass the plaintiff in any fashion, or going on or near plaintiffs house without plaintiffs 
permission. Further, the Court enjoins both parties from making threats against the other 
or to counsel. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION 
14. Each of the parties should execute such deeds, contracts, agreements, or 
other conveyances as may be necessary to transfer the property awarded to the properties. 
Ms. McConkie is to prepare a decree consistent with these findings within five (5) days. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that l'jaused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE in CIVIL NO. 92490035, postage prepaid, 
this JL day of December, 1992: 
James Byron Medlin 
Pro se 
2875 South Main Street, Suite 201A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3500 
m^d^^c^ A/?_ s/^?cJ^<-s 
APPENDIX D 
sfc/&, ^ ^ri^c^<y^ 
Kathleen McConkie (3978) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 538-1508 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA VEE MEDLIN, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
JAMES BYRON MEDLIN, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. 924900335 DA 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 14th day of October, 1992, at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. Plaintiff was present in court 
and was represented by counsel, Kathleen McConkie. Defendant was present in court 
and represented himself, Pro Se. The Court heard plaintiff's testimony as to jurisdiction 
and grounds. The Court, having heard the testimony of the parties and experts on their 
behalf and argument of counsel for both parties, and having considered all of the 
evidence heard at trial of this matter, the Court made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L Both parties are residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and have 
been for more than three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The parties were married on the 23rd day of June, 1954. 
3. The Court finds that it had jurisdiction in this matter and that the waiting 
period has passed. 
4. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences of the marriage have arisen 
l^ y a^iTd between the parties making the marriage impossible to continue and that the 
Plaintiff be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on that basis. 
5. The Court finds that this is a long-term marriage (38 years) and that 
Plaintiff has raised the parties children and run the parties home. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff is responsible in large part for the 
development of Word Making Production, Ltd. and that many of the products that 
comprise that business were strictly her creation „ _ I- • , • 
7. At present Plaintiff enjoys serious and poor health. The Court eareftrlfy~ 
observed Plaintiff's appearance,"demeanor, walk, speech and hands. The Court finds that 
Plaintiff is severely impaired at this point>and is therefore unable to work. f~- --^-'" " 
8. The CourLfinds that Defendant appganrtcrbe in good health, with the 
exception of a minor hearing problem, and appears very able-bodied and capable of 
contributing to his own support and the support of Plaintiff. / 
9. The court finds that Plaintiff is ratified-to- attorneys fees, that Plaintiffs 
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counsel, Ms. McConkie's testimony supports her hourly rate and that the fees were 
reasonable in the community and were reasonably incurred. l 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ALIMONY; 
10. Permanent alimony shall be awarded to the Plaintiff as follows: 
A. All equity in the home of the parties on Ksel Drive shall be awarded to 
Plaintiff partially as a property settlement and partially as permanent 
alimony. 
B. All royalty monies paid to Word Making Productions, Ltd. from the Pro 
Ed contract approximately ($2,687.00 per quarter) shall be awarded to 
Plaintiff as alimony. 
C. One dollar ($1.00) a year in permanent alimony to be paid by Defendant to 
Plaintiff shall be awarded. 
D. Defendant should provide documentation (tax returns and pay stubs) on a 
yearly basis to Plaintiff due on or before May of each year. The Plaintiff 
has the right to have alimony reviewed by the court on an Order to Show 
Cause calendar if Defendants income increases such that alimony should 
be increased and therefore Plaintiff should not be required to modify the 
decree of divorce if an increase of alimony is warranted. 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL INSURANCE: 
11. Defendant should procure and maintain health, accident, and dental 
insurance for the plaintiff for a period of three years. In the event that insurance coverage 
should not be sufficient to pay all expenses, Plaintiff should be responsible to pay all 
uncovered or deductible expenses between the amount paid by the insurance and the 
actual expense, including routine office visits. 
PROPERTY: 
12. During the course of this marriage, the parties have acquired real property 
and an eighty per cent (80%) interest in a business, as well as other personalty and realty. 
The court finds that an equitable distribution of such assets should be as follows: 
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B. 
The Plaintiff should be awarded the following: 
(1) The Sandy home on Ksel Drive valued at $162,000 (equity 
$156,000, a portion of which should be designated as permanent 
alimony). 
(2) Household furnishings.; ($10,830) as already divided and 
previously specified. 
(3) An equal portion of any future monies received as a result of the 
Golden Eagle Contract should be paid directly to the Plaintiff; 
(approximately 200,000). 
(4) Any stocks which Plaintiff may locate and which have value from 
Word Making Productions, Ltd. 
Tota 1 Assets: 
The Defendant is awarded: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Word Making Productions, Ltd. 
Law Office Business 
Household 
Car 
IRA's 
IRA Vee Medlin 
IRA James Medlin 
Vested Retirement Plan 
Vested Keogh 
Golden Eagle Contract 
Total Assets: 
$376,652 
$75,000 
$35,000 
$8,419 
$2,500 
$3,083 
$3,071 
$25,000 
$30,000 
$200,000 
$382,073 
13. Defendant shall be awarded Word Making Productions, Ltd. along with 
the obligations associated therewith. The Defendant agrees to hold Plaintiff harmless 
from any and all liabilities associated with Word Making Productions, Ltd. and 
indemnify her thereto. 
14. The fair market value of the parties' marital home, located at 2775 Ksel 
Drive, Sandy, Utah, was determined to be $162,000 with an approximate balance of 
$6,400 on the First Mortgage. This home should be awarded to the plaintiff as her sole 
and separate property, subject to her assuming the obligations for the first mortgage and 
holding the defendant harmless therefrom. Defendant should quit claim his interest in the 
marital residence on or before the entry of the decree of divorce. The home should be 
awarded as pan of the plaintiffs property distribution and also as pan of the alimony 
award in this case. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
15. During the course of this marriage, the parties have acquired items ot 
personal property. The parties have heretofore effected a fair and equitable division of 
these items between them. Each of the parties should be awarded the household furniture 
and personal property now in their possession and any other property they have 
previously agreed to. Defendant should make arrangements to pick up any items of 
personal property in the possession of Plaintiff on or before December 1, 1992 on a date 
certain, convenient and agreeable to both parties. If Defendant does not pick up said 
property on that specified date, the Plaintiff should have the right to dispose of that 
property as she sees fit. 
16. The defendant should be awarded the 1985 Honda CRX automobile and 
should assume the obligations associated therewith. 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
17. During the course of this marriage, the parties have incurred debts and 
obligations, both jointly and in their separate names. The plaintiff should assume the 
First Mortgage on the home located at 2775 East Ksel Drive, Sandy, Utah and hold the 
defendant harmless therefrom, in the approximate amount of $6,400 with a monthly 
payment of $416,66. The defendant should assume the payment of all back taxes on that 
said property, including but not limited to the taxes due for 1992. The current tax in the 
amount of $2,209.16 is due and owing on or before November 30, 1992. Defendant 
should pay those taxes on or before that date. The delinquent taxes on the marital 
property are $2,252.77. Defendant should assume and pay said tax debt, as quickly as 
can be arranged and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom and indemnify her thereto. 
Specifically, the defendant should pay any and all debts associated with defendant's law 
practice, the Visa obligation as well as the debt if any to Ms. Nagasawa. The defendant 
should be responsible for all other marital debts of the parties. In addition, the Defendant 
should specifically pay the $704.00 due and owing on the furnace repair, $350 for half of 
the furniture and personal property appraisal and $450 which is the amount due on the 
appraisal on the marital home. 
18. Plaintiff has" right and a judgment should enter for all past due temporary 
alimony awarded in the amount of $15,000. Defendant should pay Plaintiff the past due 
amount from the IRA accounts and/or the vested Keogh account. That amount should be 
paid on or before November 20, 1992. Defendant shall assume and pay all of Plaintiffs 
Attorney's fees and costs in the approximate amount of $12,000. 
RETIREMENT INTERESTS 
19. The Defendant shall be entitled to aU retirement funds accrued during the 
course of the parties' marriage, including vested Keogh plans, IRA's and vested 
Retirement in Word Making Productions, Ltd.. Plaintiff waives any and all interest she 
may have in those funds. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
20. The defendant should pay all of Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in this action, which amount will be paid within ninety (90) days from the date 
of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, in the approximate amount of $12,000.00 and a 
judgment for the costs already incurred, set forth on the exhibit, submitted to court is 
entered. Defendant should pay those fees directly to Plaintiff's counsel, Kathleen 
McConkie, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. Defendant should make payment arrangements with Plaintiff's counsel 
immediately. 
INJUNCTION
 / 
21. The court-enjoins the-defendant from contacting, attempting to visit or to 
harass the-plaintiff in any fashion, OF going on or near Plaintiff's property without 
A ,! A 
Plaintiff's permission. Further, the Court enjoins both parties from making threats 
against the other. No threats are to be made to counsel. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
22. Each of the parties should execute such deeds, contracts, agreements, or 
other conveyances as may be necessary to transfer the property awarded to the parties. 
DATED this day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
District Court Judge 
APPENDIX E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL'DISTRICT"COURT• 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEDLIN, ADA VEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
MEDLIN, JAMES BYRON 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. MCCONKIE, KATHLEEN M. 
D. ATTY. MEDLIN, JAMES B 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 924900335 DA 
DATE 06/24/92 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER TAPE 2(2524-3424) 
COURT CLERK SPO 
ON MOTION OF 
DEFENDANT 
COMM. RECOMMNEDS: 
1. CERTIFICATION OF READINESS FOR TRIAL REMAIN - NOT BE 
WITHDRAWN. 
2. PTC SET FOR 7-13-92 CONTINUED. 
3. DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE 45 DAYS. 
4. PTC DATE BE SET AS SOON THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE (APPR. 10 
DAYS AFTER DISCOVERY). PTC BE SET IN FRONT OF A 
COMMISSIONER. 
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APPENDIX F 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEDLIN, ADA VEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
MEDLIN, JAMES BYRON 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 92490033! 
DATE 09/24/92 
HONORABLE LESLIE A 1 
COURT REPORTER CECII 
COURT CLERK EHM 
TYPE OF HEARING: PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. MCCONKIE, KATHLEEN M. 
D. ATTY. MEDLIN, JAMES B 
THIS CASE IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR A PRE-TRIAL CONFERNC 
APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. 
AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH THE PARTIES AND MS. MCCONK 
THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS. 
1 THE PLAINTIFF IS TO PROVIDE THE DEFENDANT WITH THE 
" INFORMATION CONCERNING THE RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS WIT 
10 DAYS. THE REMAINING ISSUES REGARDING DEFENDANT 
MOTION FOR CONTEMPT ARE REFERRED TO THE COMMISSION 
2 THE CASE IS A GO FOR TRIAL ON OCT. 14, 1992 §9:30 
3! MS. MCCONKIE HAS ONE WEEK TO BRING HER EXHBITS TO 
CLERK TO BE MARKED FOR TRIAL. 
DEFENDANT HAS TWO WEEKS TO BRING HIS EXHBITS TO TH 
CLERK TO BE MARKED FOR TRIAL. 
4 BOTH SIDES ARE LIMITED TO THE WITNESSES THEY HAVE 
TODAY, UNLESS THEY DESIGNATE ADDITIONAL WITNESSES 
WRITING BY SEPT. 28, 1992 §5:00 P.M. 
5 MR MEDLIN IS TO REVIEW HIS PERSONAL INCOME TAX RE 
TODAY IN MS. MCCONKIEfS OFFICE. COPIES OF HIS PER 
INCOME TAX RETURNS ARE ALSO TO BE PROVIDED. 
APPENDIX G 
Kathleen McConkie (3978) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 537-1508 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADA VEE MEDLIN, ] 
Plaintiff ] 
v. ] 
JAMES BYRON MEDLIN, ] 
Defendant ] 
i SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
I ATTORNEY FEES OF 
> KATHLEEN MCCONKIE 
I CIVIL NO. 924900335 
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiff, Mrs. Vee Medlin, in the above entitled 
matter. 
2. Subsequent to the billings for fees on behalf of Ms. Medlin, additional 
work has been completed and additional fees have been incurred on Plaintiff's 
behalf. 
3. I have sent copies of the additional billings to Defandant James B. Medlin. 
4. The bills reflected an additional 33 hours of work totalling $3,960.00 
5. The total fee in this matter is $13,072.79. 
FflJEDBiSTmSTgGSRy 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 6 1992 
^ S^TlAK5C0UrtTY — ^ 
Deputy Cterk 
0398 
6. I have enclosed the additional billings as part of the record. 
7. Further affiant saith not. 
Dated J^LZ^^^T^ALAJ <$> / ? ?JL> 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
o SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ff^ dav of Qflo/n jnfA .19%?. 
•za c s ass «<a 3rr.t txst era ase exn tzn ZS% 
JERiiYN DEAM 1 
36 a Sfcfc 1200 Ban Life u^sr a 
Sati Lsto CftyAifrfc S£-m • 
^ C&mrniseicn Expires 1 
November 1,1906 a 
State of Utah a 
Notary Public 7 
My Commission Expires: 
/ / ' / - ^ 
Residing at: 
AJ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT in CIVIL NO. 92490035, postage prepaid, this _2L 
day of December, 1992: 
James Byron Medlin 
Prose 
2875 South Main Street, Suite 201A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3500 
-ttct^uu-^L^ Y7L d&icJ^, 
Kathleen McConkie 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200 
36 South State 
oalt Lake City UT 84111 
Invoice submitted to: 
Vee L. Medlin 
2775 East Ksel Drive 
oandy UT 84092 
December 8, 1992 
Invoice #10000 
Professional services 
10/08/92 Memorandum and conference with 
client. 
10/13/92 Preparation for trial. 
10/14/92 Trial & preparation. 
10/20/92 Trial, 
10/21/92 Trial preparation. 
11/10/92 Answ: Review of file. 
11/16/92 Draft pleading correspondence. 
Conference with Vee. 
Hrs/Rate 
3.00 
120.00/hr 
10.00 
120.00/hr 
8.00 
120.00/hr 
3.00 
120.00/hr 
2.00 
120.00/hr 
3.00 
120.00/hr 
2.00 
120.00/hr 
2.00 
120.00/hr 
Amount 
360.00 
1,200.00 
960.00 
360.00 
240.00 
360.00 
240.00 
240.00 
For professional services rendered 33.00 $3,960.00 
0401 
Vee L. Medlin Page 2 
Amount 
Balance due $3,960.00 
0402 
